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Criminal Law
by Bernadette C. Crucilla
I.

INTRODUCTION

The dynamic nature of criminal law is a result of the ongoing struggle
between those who prosecute individuals charged with crimes and those
who defend them. It is, therefore, not practical to try to include every
change in criminal law occurring during a particular survey period.' I
have sifted through the cases and statutory amendments from June 1,
2014 through May 31, 2015 and selected those with the widest application or interest to criminal law practitioners.
II.

LEGISLATION

Statutory changes this survey period are illustrative of the times in
which we live. These changes include our state's continued dedication
to accountability courts, a relaxation of driver's license suspensions, and
the creation of a number of new crimes. Each will be discussed in turn.
A.

Veterans' Court

Accountability courts have existed in Georgia for several decades.2
These courts provide alternatives to incarceration by targeting specific
populations and addressing those populations' underlying reasons for

* Owner/Attorney, Crucilla Law Firm LLC, Macon, Georgia. University of South
Florida (B.A., 1993); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
1996). Member, State Bar of Georgia; American Bar Association; Georgia Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers; Macon Bar Association; National Innocence Network (Shaken
Baby Division). Master, Bootle Inn of Court.
1. For an analysis of Georgia criminal law during the prior survey period, see
Bernadette C. Crucilla, CriminalLaw, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 66 MERCER L. REV.
37 (2014).
2.

See Georgia, SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY, ACCOUNTABILITY COURTS-

HISTORY, http://www.fultoncourt.org/accountability/acc-history.php
2015).
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criminal activity.' There were more than ninety such courts operating
in Georgia by 2011, including felony drug courts, mental health courts,
and DUI courts, and now nearly every county in Georgia boasts at least
one. 4 While a statute in 2005' provided the authority for the creation
of drug courts, the legislature did not authorize mental health courts
until 2011.6 Based upon their widespread successes, this survey period
is significant for the addition of section 15-1-17 of the Official Code of
Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),' which added veterans' courts to the
family of accountability courts.8
The Georgia General Assembly aptly recognizes the unique "physical,
emotional, or mental impairments" incurred by our service men or
women that contributes to their criminal behaviors and the need to
address these specialized treatment issues.? To that end, the statute
authorizes any criminal court to establish a separate veterans' court to
provide alternative dispositions for veterans who meet defined eligibility
criteria.o The statute mandates the establishment of a planning group
consisting of judges, prosecutors, public defenders, law enforcement
officials, and others familiar with veterans' services to develop a written
work plan for the implementation of the program." It is envisioned
that, at a minimum, the veterans' courts combine "judicial supervision,
treatment . . ., and drug and mental health testing as incarceration
alternatives."12
Although the written work plan must include defined eligibility
criteria, it has some limitations. 3 For example, one limitation notes,
"[diefendants charged with murder, armed robbery, rape, aggravated
sodomy, aggravated sexual battery, aggravated child molestation, or
child molestation [or any combination thereof] shall not be eligible for
entry" into the program "except in the case of a separate court supervised reentry program designed to more closely monitor veterans

3.

See JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF GEORGIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS (2011),

http://w2.georgiacourts.org/ga/files/Georgia%2OAccountability%20Courts %20Defining%20
Elements.pdf.
4. Id.
5. See Ga. H.R. Bill 254, Reg. Sess., 2005 Ga. Laws 1505.
6. See Ga. S. Bill 39, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 224.
7. O.C.G.A. § 15-1-17 (2015).
8. Ga. S. Bill 320 § 1, Reg. Sess., 2014 Ga. Laws 79 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 15-1-17).
9. See id.
10. O.C.G.A. § 15-1-17(b)(1).
11. Id. § 15-1-17(b)(3). The statute also mandates the Council of Accountability Court
Judges of Georgia to adopt standards and practices, taking into consideration ongoing
research and guidelines published by veterans' needs experts. Id. § 15-1-17(b)(4).
12. Id. § 15-1-17(b)(3).
13. See id.
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returning to the community after having served a term of incarceration."'4 The statute further mandates successful completion of the
program be defined, and after completion, that the case may be
dismissed without adjudication or result in a modified sentence. 5
There are provisions for confidentiality of records and expungement
opportunities for successful completion of the program.'" Funding for
the veterans' courts shall come from a combination of federal, state, and
county funds, as well as private donations."
B.

Driver's License Suspensions
There were significant "common sense" changes made relating to
driver's license suspensions and limited driving permits.'" Across the
board, these changes relaxed the mandated suspension of driver's
licenses as well as when limited driving permits can be obtained.' For
example, drivers under the age of twenty-one will no longer be subject
to license suspension for underage possession or purchase of alcohol."
In addition, mandatory suspension of licenses will no longer be required
upon conviction for generalized "controlled substance" offenses that do
not involve the operation of a motor vehicle.2 ' Also, those charged with
driving with a suspended registration may now plead nolo contendre
once every five years to avoid a license suspension.22
Drivers who have had their license suspended in another state may
now obtain a Georgia limited driving permit if they can meet Georgia's
criteria. 23 Further, those individuals with limited driving permits may
now drive for work purposes and not merely to and from work.2 1 All
drivers (even those with suspensions for second DUI convictions) are now

-

14. Id.
15. Id. § 15-1-17(c)(1)-(4).
16. Id. §§ 15-1-17(c)(2)-(4), (f).
17. Id. § 15-1-17(b)(9).
18. See Ga. S. Bill 100, Reg. Sess. (2015).
19. See Ga. S. Bill 100, Reg. Sess. §§ 4-13, 4-17.
20. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-15, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 40-5-57.1,
63(e), (f) (2014 & Supp. 2015)).
21. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-18, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75 (2014
& Supp. 2015)).
22. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-24, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 40-6-15(a)-(c)
(2014 & Supp. 2015)).
23. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-8, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 40-5-22(d) (2014
& Supp. 2015)).
24. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-17, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 40-5-64 (2014
& Supp. 2015)).
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eligible for limited driving permits if they are participating in a drug,
mental health, or veterans' court.25
C.

New Crimes

This survey period was also significant for several new additions to
Georgia's lexicon of crime. These changes exemplify how crimes tend to
evolve along with societal norms.
1. Refund Fraud. Effective July 1, 2014, the General Assembly has
added the crime of "refund fraud" to the books.26 This crime makes it
unlawful to use a false or unauthorized name or false information to
obtain a store refund." The refund can be in any form, such as
monetary or any other type of credit." As with many other theft
related crimes, the punishment is tied to the value of the stolen
property.29 For example, if the property that is the subject of the
refund is worth $500 or less, the punishment is that of a misdemeanor.3 0 If the property is worth more than $500, the punishment increases to felony status and the penalty is imprisonment for one to ten
years." Punishment is also tied to the timeframe over which the crime
occurs and the number of prior convictions.
2. Murder in the Second Degree. The General Assembly
established a new degree of murder this period: murder in the second
degree." This degree of murder is similar to felony murder in that it
requires proof of a predicate act (cruelty to children in the second
degree). 34 A person commits second degree murder if "in the commission of cruelty to children in the second degree, he or she causes the
death of another human being irrespective of malice." 5 Presumably,

25. Ga. S. Bill 100 § 4-18, Reg. Sess. (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 40-5-75(a)).
26. Ga. S. Bill 382 § 1-1, 2014 Ga. Laws 404 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-8-14.1 (Supp.
2015)).
27. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-8-14.1(a)(1)-(2).
28. Id. § 16-8-14.1(a)(2).
29. Id. § 16-8-14.1(b).
30. Id. § 16-8-14.1(b)(1).
31. Id. § 16-8-14.1(b)(2).
32. Id. §§ 16-8-14.1(b)(3)-(4), (c)(1)-(3). For example, if the property's total value is over
$500 and is taken from three separate establishments within one county during a period
of seven days, or taken during a period of 180 days, the punishment shall be imprisonment
from one to ten years. Id. § 16-8-14.1(b)(3)-(4).
33. Ga. H.R. Bill 271 § 1-1, Reg. Sess., 2014 Ga. Laws 444 (codified as amended at
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(d) (2011 & Supp. 2015)).
34. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(d).
35. Id.
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the death could be either the death of the child or of any other person
while the defendant is committing cruelty to children in the second
degree, intended or not. However, because the statute expressly
provides the underlying felony must be "cruelty to children in the second
degree," one cannot help but wonder whether a demurrer (or directed
verdict) would lie if the underlying act is cruelty to children in the first
degree. 6 Unlike other forms of murder, which carry a mandatory life
sentence, second degree murder carries a sentence of ten to thirty
years.
3. Home Invasion in the First and Second Degree. The General
Assembly also created the new crime of home invasion (in either the first
or second degree).38 This crime is a hybrid between burglary and
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.3 ' The elements of home
invasion in the first degree are as follows: a person who, without
authority and with an intent to commit a forcible felony therein, and
while in possession of a deadly weapon,40 enters the dwelling house of
another while such dwelling house is occupied by any person with
authority to be present in the home.4 ' As with burglary, it appears
that only the intent to commit the forcible felony must be proved, and
not the actual commission thereof 42 Upon conviction, the penalty is
ten to twenty years or life imprisonment, and a fine of up to $100,000.43

Presumably, if a defendant intends to commit another crime (that is not
a forcible felony), then he or she would not be guilty of first degree home
invasion (although he or she would certainly be facing other issues)."

&

36. Id. Cruelty to children in the second degree requires causing a child cruel or
excessive physical or mental pain through criminal negligence, while first degree requires
wilfully depriving the child of necessary sustenance or maliciously causing a child excessive
physical or mental pain. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-5-70(a)-(c) (2011).
37. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(e)(1), with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1(e)(2).
38. Ga. H.R. Bill 770 § 3, Reg. Sess., 2014 Ga. Laws 426 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5
(2015)).
39. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5 (home invasion), with O.C.G.A. § 16-7-1(b) (2011
Supp. 2015) (burglary), and O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (aggravated
assault with a deadly weapon).
40. As in aggravated assault, a deadly weapon is defined as an "instrument which,
when used offensively against a person, is likely to or actually does result in serious bodily
injury." Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(b) (home invasion), with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(b)(2)
(aggravated assault with a deadly weapon).
41. O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(b).
42. Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(b) (first degree home invasion), with O.C.G.A. § 16-71(b) (burglary).
43. O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(d).
44. See id. § 16-7-5(b).
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Second degree home invasion has the exact same elements as first
degree, with the exception of the intent element." With second degree,
the defendant needs to only intend to commit a forcible misdemeanor,
although the conviction thereof is a felony." Upon conviction of second
degree home invasion, the penalty is five to twenty years imprisonment
and a fine of up to $100,000.47
The statute further permits the judge to sentence a defendant to all
or part probation, but a wholly deferred or suspended sentence is not
permitted.4 ' Additional statutory provisions related to this new crime
make home invasion in the first degree a class A designated felony act
in the juvenile code and home invasion in the second degree a class B
designated felony.49 The crimes of home invasion (in any degree) have
also been added to the list of crimes for which there are enhanced
minimum punishments for multiple convictions if a firearm is used.o
Also, home invasion has been added to the list of crimes that are
bailable only before a superior court judge."
4. Strangulation. Strangulation has been explicitly added as one
manner in which to commit an aggravated assault.52 As of July 1,
2014, one can commit an aggravated assault by using "any object, device,
or instrument which, when used offensively against a person, is likely
to or actually does result in strangulation."" The aggravated assault
statute also defines "strangulation."54 The penalty for aggravated
assault by strangulation remains the same as for other means of
aggravated assault, one to twenty years in prison with enhanced
55
imprisonment for specific classes of victims.

5. Transmission of Sexually Explicit Images of Adults. It is now
a crime to "post" or otherwise electronically transmit images of another

45. CompareO.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(b) (first degree home invasion), with O.C.G.A. § 16-7-5(c)
(second degree home invasion).
46. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-7-5(c), (d).
47. Id. § 16-7-5(d).
48. Id. § 16-7-5(e).
49. O.C.G.A. §§ 15-11-2(12), (13) (2015).
50. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-133(b) (2011 & Supp. 2015) (second conviction with gun requires
consecutive imprisonment for fifteen years).
51. Ga. H.R. Bill 770 § 9, 2014 Ga. Laws 426 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 17-61(a)(5.1) (2013 & Supp. 2015)).
52. Ga. H.R. Bill 911 § 1, 2014 Ga. Laws 441 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 16-521(b)(3) (2011 & Supp. 2015)).
53. Id.
54. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(a) (2011 & Supp. 2015).
55. See O.C.G.A. § 16-5-21(c) (2011 & Supp. 2015).
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adult that depict nudity5 6 for the purposes of harassment or causing
financial loss to the depicted person and which serves no legitimate
purpose.5 ' A violation of the Georgia Code section shall be punishable
as a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature, but a second or
subsequent conviction shall be a felony, carrying one to five years in
prison."58

6. Cruelty to Animals. The General Assembly ramped up the
applicable punishments for cruelty to animals and expanded some
definitions, perhaps due to increased incidents of animal hoarding and
other like abuses. 9
First, the General Assembly broadened the
definition of the crime to include more variety."o A person commits the
offense of cruelty to animals when they (1) cause physical pain,
suffering, or death to an animal by any unjustifiable act or omission or
(2) having intentionally exercised care, custody, control, ownership, or
possession of an animal, fails to provide the animal adequate food,
water, sanitary conditions, or ventilation consistent with what a
reasonable person would believe is the normal requirement for the
animal's size, species, breed, age, and physical condition. 6 ' The first
conviction continues to be a misdemeanor;6 2 however, the penalties
increase for subsequent convictions. 63 A second conviction will now be
considered a misdemeanor of a high and aggravated nature, which
increases the fine to $15,000.64 Also significant is that crimes committed in other states and juvenile convictions are counted as prior convictions."
The General Assembly expanded the definition of aggravated cruelty
to animals (a felony), which is punishable by one to five years in prison
and a fine of up to $15,000.66

A second conviction carries one to ten

56. Nudity shall mean the showing of male or female genital, pubic areas or buttocks,
or female breasts, if less than fully covered. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-90(a)(2) (Supp. 2015).
57. Ga. H.R. Bill 838 § 1, 2014 Ga. Laws 220 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 16-11-90 (Supp.
2015)).
58. O.C.G.A. § 16-11-90(c).
59. Ga. H.R. Bill 863, 2014 Ga. Laws 492 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4
(2011 & Supp. 2015)).
60. Id.
61. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(b).
62. Misdemeanors carry up to twelve months in county jail, although most cases result
in only twelve months probation. See O.C.G.A. § 17-10-3 (2013 & Supp. 2015).
63. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(c).
64. Id. §§ 16-12-4(c),(e); see also Ga. H.R. Bill 863 § 1, 2014 Ga. Laws 492.
65. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(c).
66. Ga. H.R. Bill 863, 2014 Ga. Laws 492 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 16-124(e)).
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Aggravated cruelty to

animals can be committed in any of five different ways: (1) maliciously
causing the death of an animal; (2) maliciously causing an animal
physical harm by depriving it of a member of its body, rendering a part
of its body useless, or seriously disfiguring it; (3) maliciously torturing
the animal by inflicting severe or prolonged physical pain; (4) maliciously poisoning an animal or exposing it to any poisonous material; or (5)
having intentionally exercised care, custody, control, ownership, or
possession of an animal and failing to provide the animal with adequate
food, water, sanitary conditions, or ventilation consistent with what a
reasonable person believes is the normal requirement for the animal's
size, species, breed, age, and physical condition to the extent that the
animal dies or a member of its body is rendered useless or seriously
disfigured."
III.

CASE LAW CHANGES

This period was not without activity in the appellate courts. Case law
changes fell into several categories: changes in Fourth Amendment laws,
admonitions to lawyers when rendering client advice for guilty pleas,
and strict curtailments to criminal trial judges' comments in front of the
jury. Each will be discussed in turn.
A.

Fourth Amendment
A number of important cases dealing with Fourth Amendment issues
were decided during this period. These include warrant requirements
for blood testing in DUI cases; smell alone being sufficient probable
cause for a search warrant; and the need for actual submission to police
authority to constitute a seizure.
1. Blood Testing and DUI. In Williams v. State," the Georgia
Supreme Court first determined the compelled extraction of blood (to test
for intoxication in a DUI case) violated Fourth Amendment protections 70 and constituted an intrusion into the human body.n Therefore,
to obtain blood without a search warrant, the state would have to show
either exigent circumstances existed or that actual voluntary consent
was obtained from the defendant.
Whether exigent circumstances

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

O.C.G.A. § 16-12-4(e).
Id. § 16-12-4(d).
296 Ga. 817, 771 S.E.2d 373 (2015).
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
Williams, 296 Ga. at 819, 771 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at 819-20, 821, 771 S.E.2d at 375-76.
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existed will no longer be automatically established simply because
"alcohol dissipates quickly in the body," and it must now be determined
on a case by case basis." In other words, exigency must be determined
under the totality of the circumstances.7 4 In a regular DUI situation,
where nothing other than normal delay existed, a warrant will likely be
required." If the officer articulates that a specific delay existed, the
dissipation of alcohol in the body will likely constitute a sufficient
exigency to preclude the need for a warrant."
The supreme court then turned from the exigency analysis to the other
warrant exception, consent." The court held that mere acquiescence
to a blood test based upon a reading of the statutory implied consent
notice would not necessarily constitute "actual, and therefore voluntary,
consent" for Fourth Amendment purposes." The court held that actual
consent must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances." Because the trial court failed to address the voluntariness of the
consent, the case was remanded for further analysis.o It is anticipated
that the consent issue will provide fertile ground for pretrial motions in
DUI "blood-draw" cases moving forward. These may include whether the
defendant was under duress, whether the defendant depended upon the
license for his or her livelihood, whether the consent was the product of
coercion, whether the defendant was under arrest, and whether the
defendant was intoxicated at the time consent was given."
2. Odors Alone Can Justify Search Warrant. In State v.
Kazmierczak,82 the Georgia Court of Appeals ruled that the odor of raw
marijuana, alone, can be the sole basis for the issuance of a search
warrant." In so ruling, the court examined a number of federal cases

73. Id. at 820-21, 771 S.E.2d at 376.
74. See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1563, 1567-68 (2013) (finding the officer
did not identify any factors showing he faced an unusual delay in securing a warrant, thus,
a warrant was needed). But cf Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966)
(officer articulated delay was based on the need to investigate accident and to transport
defendant to a hospital, thus, exigent circumstances precluded the need for a warrant).
75. See McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 1568.
76. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
77. Williams, 296 Ga. at 821, 771 S.E.2d at 377.
78. Id. at 822, 771 S.E.2d at 377.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 823, 771 S.E.2d at 377.
81. See State v. Aiken, 282 Ga. 132, 135-36, 646 S.E.2d 222, 225-26 (2007); State v.
Fulghum, 261 Ga. App. 594, 596, 583 S.E.2d 278, 281 (2003); State v. Durrence, 295 Ga.
App. 216, 217, 671 S.E.2d 261, 263 (2008).
82. 331 Ga. App. 817, 771 S.E.2d 473 (2015).
83. Id. at 822, 771 S.E.2d at 478.
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from numerous jurisdictions and observed this rationale was widely
accepted.84 The court noted there were two different standards for
probable cause based on distinctive odors-one for the warrantless
search of a vehicles8 and another for the issuance of search warrants
for a residence86-and determined the two standards should be brought
into line.8 7 Thus, the court held if the officer is qualified to recognize
the odor of marijuana and these qualifications are apparent in the
warrant affidavit, then probable cause for the warrant can be established based on smell alone."
3. No Seizure Without Actual Submission. In State v. Walker,"
the Georgia Supreme Court analyzed the elements of a Fourth Amendment seizure, noting that not only must an officer restrain the liberty of
an individual by making an assertion of authority, but there must also
be actual submission to that authority.o In Walker, an officer apprehended a defendant stepping off school premises and instructed him to
remove his hands from his pockets. Although the defendant stopped,
when asked to remove his hands, he ran away.91
The court reversed the court of appeals decision (which held the officer
only needed articulable suspicion) determining the court had gone
"astray" from applicable law. 2 The court reasoned that although an
officer's command can be an assertion of his authority sufficient to form
the basis for a seizure, the seizure does not actually occur until the
suspect submits to that authority." However, because the defendant
fled rather than submitting to the officer's authority, no seizure had
occurred and suppression of the contraband was not proper.94

84. Id. at 821-22, 771 S.E.2d at 478.
85. State v. Folk, 238 Ga. App. 206, 209, 521 S.E.2d 194, 198 (1999) (holding the smell
of burning marijuana alone established probable cause for search of vehicle).
86. Shivers v. State, 258 Ga. App. 253, 257, 573 S.E.2d 494, 497-98 (2002) (holding the
odor of marijuana outside house is only one factor when determining probable cause for
issuance of a warrant).
87. Kazmierczak, 331 Ga. App. at 821, 771 S.E.2d at 477 (noting it is well established
that a warrantless search of an automobile must be based on same degree of probable
cause sufficient for search warrant).
88. Id. at 823, 771 S.E.2d at 478.
89. 295 Ga. 888, 764 S.E.2d 804 (2014).
90. Id. at 890, 891, 764 S.E.2d at 806.
91. Id. at 888, 764 S.E.2d at 805.
92. Id. at 890, 764 S.E.2d at 806.
93. Id. at 891, 764 S.E.2d at 806.
94. Id. at 894-95, 764 S.E.2d at 809.
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B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
As every criminal trial lawyer knows, one of the most common claims
raised post conviction is that the defense lawyer provided ineffective
representation. This year, the Georgia Supreme Court reminds us that
such claims do not always come about after a trial, but that they can
arise even after a carefully considered guilty plea. Two cases provide
defense lawyers with some guidance on considerations when counseling
their clients in guilty plea situations.
The Georgia Supreme Court held that where the law is clear that
deportation is mandatory upon conviction of a crime, a lawyer has a duty
to accurately inform the client of that fact prior to the entry of a guilty
plea." In Encarnacion v. State," the defendant, a legal permanent
resident who had entered a guilty plea to burglary, filed a habeas corpus
action seeking to withdraw the plea. He claimed the plea was not
knowing and voluntary because his lawyer was ineffective.97 Apparently, the lawyer advised the defendant the conviction "may" or "could"
impact his immigration status, but because he was sentenced under the
First Offender Act," he "would not have a conviction for burglary" if he
completed his sentence." The habeas court denied the defendant's
petition, finding the lawyer provided the defendant "with consistent,
accurate advice about the risk" he was facing and the advice was neither
"mis-advice" nor "insufficient or inadequate."o
On review, the Georgia Supreme Court analyzed the matter with
regard to Padilla v. Kentucky,'' a United States Supreme Court
case.' 02 In that case, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment 0 3
guarantees effective legal advice about deportation consequences and
where immigration consequences of a plea are "truly clear," the duty to
give correct advice is "equally clear."' 04 The Georgia Supreme Court
further noted the felony offense of burglary clearly fell within the
definition of an "aggravated felony" in the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA)"o' and the grant of first offender status was of no import

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Encarnacion v. State, 295 Ga. 660, 663, 763 S.E.2d 463, 466 (2014).
295 Ga. 660, 763 S.E.2d 463 (2014).
Id. at 660, 763 S.E.2d at 464.
O.C.G.A. §§ 42-8-60 to -66 (2014).
Encarnacion,295 Ga. at 660, 765 S.E.2d at 464.
Id. at 661, 765 S.E.2d at 464.
559 U.S. 356 (2009).
Encarnacion,295 Ga. at 661, 765 S.E.2d at 465.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Padilla, 559 U.S. at 369, 373.
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 to 1537 (2012).
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because "federal immigration law treats a guilty plea to an aggravated
felony as a conviction even if the conviction is ultimately expunged."'
The supreme court thus held that "where . . . the law is clear that
deportation is mandatory . . ., an attorney has a duty to accurately
advise his client of that fact."o
In yet another case, the court ruled it no longer matters whether a
guilty plea gives rise to a direct or collateral consequence; instead, in
every case involving the attempted withdrawal of a guilty plea based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, the analysis must be made under the
familiar Strickland v. Washington1s standard.'
In Alexander v.
State,"o a defendant sought to withdraw his guilty plea based on
ineffective assistance of counsel, claiming his counsel failed to advise
him he would not be eligible for parole on a fifteen year prison sentence
because he was a recidivist."' The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.11 2 The court of
appeals determined it was constrained by the supreme court's holding
in Williams v. Duffy,"' which regarded parole eligibility as a collateral
consequence of a criminal sentence (and a lawyer's failure to inform a
client about a collateral consequence could never be the basis for
deficient performance)." 4
The supreme court noted there were two analyses at issue." 5 First,
those cases where a lawyer completely failed to inform a criminal
defendant of the collateral consequences of a plea (which would never
constitute deficient performance);" 6 second, those cases where a lawyer
actually misinformed a defendant about such consequences, which were
analyzed under a Sixth Amendment, Strickland approach."1 7
The
supreme court then reviewed a number of recent cases involving claims
alleging ineffectiveness in the context of guilty pleas, including the
Supreme Court's decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, and determined the

106. Encarnacion,295 Ga. at 662, 763 S.E.2d at 465.
107. Id. at 663, 763 S.E.2d at 466.
108. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
109. Alexander v. State, 297 Ga. 59, 64, 772 S.E.2d 655, 659 (2015).
110. 297 Ga. 59, 772 S.E.2d 655 (2015).
111. Id. at 59, 772 S.E.2d at 656.
112. Id.; see also Alexander v. State, 328 Ga. App. 300, 761 S.E.2d 844 (2014).
113. 270 Ga. 580, 513 S.E.2d 212 (1999).
114. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 59, 772 S.E.2d at 656; see also Alexander, 328 Ga. App. at
307, 761 S.E.2d at 849.
115. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 62, 64, 772 S.E.2d at 658, 659.
116. See id. at 65, 772 S.E.2d at 660.
117. See Alexander, 328 Ga. App. at 303, 761 S.E.2d at 846-47.
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better approach is to evaluate all such claims with the familiar
Strickland two-part analysis.1 8
The court, however, was careful to note an attorney's failure to offer
advice on a collateral consequence will not rise to a constitutionally
deficient level in every situation, but that courts should weigh deficient
performance by looking to the practice and expectations of the legal
community, including the prevailing norms of practice in the American
Bar Association standards."'9 The court also cited three specific factors
to review: (1) "whether the collateral consequence is intimately related
to the criminal process and is 'nearly an automatic result,'" (2) "whether
the consequence is a 'drastic measure' or a penalty with harsh ramifications," and (3) "whether the law imposing the consequence is 'succinct,
clear and explicit.""20 Using the above factors, the court concluded an
attorney's failure to inform the client about the ineligibility for parole
was, in fact, deficient performance and remanded the case to the trial
court to determine if the client was prejudiced.
C. Judicial Comments
Several cases this survey period illustrate the Georgia Supreme
Court's intolerance towards judicial comments about evidence that
violates O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57122 if made in front of the jury. That statute
shall be strictly upheld regardless of whether the comment is intentional, whether there is any actual prejudice to the defendant, and/or
whether a defendant objects or even raises it on appeal. 1 2 3
In Rouse v. State,'2 4 during the trial court's preliminary instructions
to the entire venire, it stated, "This process this morning is what[] we
call voir dire. Voir dire just simply means to speak the truth. This
means that you will be hearing about a case, which is a murder case,
that happened in Muscogee County, and you'll be asked questions about

118. Alexander, 297 Ga. at 62 n.5, 772 S.E.2d at 658 n.5.
119. Id. at 64, 772 S.E.2d at 659.
120. Id. at 64-65, 772 S.E.2d at 659-60 (quoting Padilla,559 U.S. at 361, 366, 381).
121. Id. at 65, 772 S.E.2d at 660.
122. O.C.G.A. § 17-8-57 (2013 & Supp. 2015).
It is error for any judge in any criminal case, during its progress or in his charge
to the jury, to express or intimate his opinion as to what has or has not been
proved or as to the guilt of the accused. Should any judge violate this Code
section, the violation shall be held by the [court] to be error and the decision in the
case reversed, and a new trial granted in the court below ....
Id.
123. See Rouse v. State, 296 Ga. 213, 214-15, 765 S.E.2d 879, 880 (2014).
124. 296 Ga. 213, 765 S.E.2d 879 (2014).
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this case."l25 The court concluded that this comment "clearly and
unambiguously" suggested that venue had been established (or was not
in dispute). 2 6 This conclusion was true regardless of the fact that the
word "venue" was not even mentioned in the comment. 1 27
The court reasoned voir dire is part of the "progress" of the case, and
it was clear the jurors who decided the case were all members of the
venire to which the trial court's comments were directed. 2 8 Nor could
the comment be construed as one regarding what the state expected to
prove at trial.1 29 Further, the court noted, contrary to the dissent's
argument, that the court's later instructions, although they may have
touched upon the issue of context, could not cure the prejudice because
any violation of the statute is subject to a "super-plain-error" standard
of review.13 0 Interestingly, in a blistering, three judge dissent authored by Justice Nahmias, a vigorous plea was made to the General
131
Assembly to repeal portions of the statute.
The same thing occurred in a case decided three months later. In
Sales v. State,132 while instructing the prospective jurors to consider
whether they had heard about the case or knew the parties, the judge
told the venire, "This happened in Taylor County. So if anybody knows
any of the parties, we would respectfully ask you to let us know
now."' 3 Based on the identical analysis, the court ordered a new
trial. 14

Yet another case this period was overturned due to a trial court's
comment on the evidence. This time, the offending comment occurred
in the context of admitting the defendant's recorded statement into
evidence. At trial, two recorded statements of the defendant were sought
to be introduced. When attempting to introduce the second interview,
the defendant objected."' The state indicated that "the issue of
The trial judge
voluntariness has already been addressed. ...

125. Id. at 215, 765 S.E.2d at 880 (alterations in original).
126. Id. at 215, 765 S.E.2d at 880-81.
127. Id. at 215-16, 765 S.E.2d at 881.
128. Id. at 217, 765 S.E.2d at 882.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 218, 765 S.E.2d at 882-83.
131. Id. at 238, 765 S.E.2d at 895-96 (Hines, Nahmias & Blackwell, JJ., dissenting).
The dissent noted the comment was unintentional and made before voir dire had begun,
it must be considered in its context, the defendant did not object at trial or during the
motion for new trial, and venue was not disputed at trial. Id. at 219, 765 S.E.2d at 883.
132. 296 Ga. 538, 769 S.E.2d 374 (2015).
133. Id. at 540, 769 S.E.2d at 376.
134. Id. at 541, 769 S.E.2d at 376.
135. Freeman v. State, 295 Ga. 820, 821, 764 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2014).
136. Id.
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responded, "All right. I find that the statement was freely and
voluntarily given as previously ruled. I'll admit it over the objection.

.

."13

The court determined the statement to be a violation of O.C.G.A. § 178-57 as an improper comment on the evidence."as The court explained
that determining the admissibility of a defendant's statement in a
criminal case is a two-step process.13 ' First, the court determines,
outside the presence of the jury, whether the statement is voluntary.'40
Second, if the court deems the statement voluntary, the statement is
admitted for the jury to make the ultimate determination on its
voluntariness, and thus, its probity."' The court instructed, "Having
made the determination that a statement is voluntary, the trial court
should simply admit it into evidence and not inform the jury of its
ruling."14 2 The court further cautioned that ruling before the jury on
the voluntariness of a defendant's statement, "even when coupled with
an explanation as to the roles played by the trial court and the jury,"
amounts to a violation of the statute and demands a new trial. 143
IV.

CONCLUSION

This year was significant for statutory changes that reaffirmed the
General Assembly's attempt to stay progressive, via establishing
veterans' courts, taking a more common sense approach to the suspension of driver's licenses, and by enacting some new modernized crimes.
The appellate courts issued a number of decisions providing guidance to
police officers when apprehending suspects and providing cautionary
guidance both to attorneys in plea scenarios and to criminal trial judges
when speaking before a jury.

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 821-22, 764 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 822, 764 S.E.2d at 393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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